An asymmetric generalization of classical Cournot's duopoly game was introduced and the simulation scheme of its quantized version was analyzed. In this scheme, the player assigned by a 'classical' measurement scheme always wins the player assigned by a quantum measurement scheme. It was shown that the fluctuation causes the disadvantage game rule of the player measured by the quantum apparatus in this specific case.
I. INTRODUCTION OF ASYMMETRIC GENERALIZATION OF CLASSICAL COURNOT's DUOPOLY
Significant interest has been focused on quantum games [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , a new born branch of quantum information theory, which can exploit both quantum superposition [1, 3] and quantum entanglement [2, 4] . Among them, asymmetric quantum games have also been investigated [13] [14] [15] . Some previous studies on the asymmetric quantum games have revealed the player utilizing quantum strategies has the advantage than the one only using classical strategies [15] . The role of quantum correlation or classical correlation on the quantum Prisoner's dilemma has also been investigated [16] , and the influence of quantum fluctuations on quantum games has been discussed [17] . However, there is still very little attention focusing on the asymmetric quantum games in which the asymmetry is caused by different measurement schemes or evaluation schemes assigned to different players.
Recently, a simulation scheme without any entanglement involved of quantized Cournot's Duopoly has been presented [18] , which is different from the quantization scheme containing the intermediate entanglement in Ref. [19] . It has been shown that the scheme using classical measuring apparatus is advantage to the one using the quantum measuring apparatus [18] . Here, we will analyze its asymmetric version in which two firms are assigned as different measurement schemes or evaluation schemes. Firstly, let us introduce an asymmetric generalization of classical Cournot's duopoly game [20] , two firms simultaneously decide the quantities q 1 (q 1 ≥ 0) and q 2 (q 2 ≥ 0) respectively, of a homogeneous product released on the market. Two firms have different execution precisions for their strategies. Assuming the firm 1 can definitely execute its strategy without any possible deviation, and the firm 2 can only execute its strategy with outcomes η 2 ∈ N probabilistically distributing on the set of the nonnegative integer with the probability distribution function D(q 2 , η 2 ) which has the constraint condition ∞ η2=0 D(q 2 , η 2 ) = 1 and the expected value q 2 given by q 2 = ∞ η2=0 η 2 D(q 2 , η 2 ). The distribution * Electronic address: stephenli74@yahoo.com.cn D(q 2 , η 2 ) of the firm 2 is common knowledge. Suppose Λ is the total quantity, i.e., Λ = q 1 + η 2 , and the marketclearing price is given by P (Λ) = a − Λ for Λ ≤ a and P (Λ) = 0 for Λ > a. The unit cost of producing the product is assumed to be c with c < a. In the extreme case with a → ∞ and c → ∞ but keeping k = a − c a finite nonnegative constant, the average payoff functions of two firms can be obtained as
where
is the standard deviation of η 2 . For clarifying the role of statistical phenomenon of the optical field in the later simulation scheme of this kind of the game, adopting the Mandel-Q parameter Q(q 2 ) ≡
q2 − 1 [21] , which is related with the second order intensity correlation function
, the above average payoff function can be rewritten as
It explicitly shows the asymmetry of this game increases with the Mandel-Q parameter.
In the above game, a strategy profile {q * 1 , q * 2 } is a Nash equilibrium if no unilateral deviation in strategy by firm 1 or 2 is profitable for firm 1 or 2, respectively, that are u 1 (q * 1 , q * 2 ) > u 1 (q 1 , q * 2 ) and u 2 (q * 1 , q * 2 ) > u 1 (q * 1 , q 2 ) holding for any q 1 = q * 1 and q 2 = q * 2 [22] . Since
, Nash equilibrium condition is ∂u1 ∂q1 = ∂u2 ∂q2 = 0 if the inequality
> −2 holds for the solution of equilibrium condition. Solving for the Nash equilibrium yields the equilibria,
where q * 2 is the nonnegative root of the equation
Thereafter, it is assumed Eq.(5) has unique nonnegative root. In the above derivations, it has been assumed ∆ 2 η 2 is differentiable and simultaneously
> −2. One will find the sign of δ(q * 2 ) ≡ ∂∆ 2 η2 ∂q * 2 plays a crucial role in the Nash equilibria, which determines the degree of the strategic asymmetry in the game.
In what follows, let us consider some specific cases corresponding to zero, negative, and positive values of δ(q * 2 ). For example, in the case 1 with ∆ 2 (η 2 ) = const.,
. For the case 2 with δ(q * 2 ) < 0 (namely the firm 2 can improve its execution efficiency and precision with the increase of the product manufactured), the firm 2 can obtain more profit than the firm 1 if only
(6) In the case 3, we assume the Poisson distribution
. At this equilibrium the payoffs for the firm i (i = 1, 2) are
In the following section, it will be shown that this equilibrium fails to be the optimal solution for most values of the parameter k, because two firms could simultaneously achieve more payoff than the one in Eq. (7) from the region D of Fig.3 . In the above discussion, the different execution precision of the strategies cause the asymmetry of the game. Equivalently, different evaluation schemes for two firms may result in the same asymmetric game. The above asymmetric generalization of classical Cournot's Duopoly can not only be applied to economical and managemental fields, may also find its application in a class of two "detector" systems, such as the 3D vision system. For example, the self-regulating aperture or pupils play the similar role as two firms in this game which control the light intensity analoging with the q i (i = 1, 2) in Eq.(1); CCD, CMOS or retina play the evaluation role; The clarity or the signal noise ratio of the picture maybe have monotonic relations with the payoffs in Eq. (1) . As an interesting illustration, there is no one owning the same left and right eyes, and the brain of human being will control two pupils, and simultaneously coordinate the information received by left and right retina. Thus it is worthy to investigate how the potential cooperation affects this kind of asymmetric game.
II. SIMULATION SCHEME OF QUANTIZED COURNOT's DUOPOLY WITH DIFFERENT MEASUREMENT APPARATUSES
Considering a simulation scheme for the quantized version of above asymmetric game of the case 3, two singlemode optical fields which are initially at the vacuum state |0 1 ⊗ |0 2 are sent to firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. the strategic moves of firm 1 and firm 2 are represented by the displacement operatorsD 1 andD 2 locally acted on their individual optical fields. The firms are restricted to choose their strategies from the sets 
Having executed their moves, firm 1 and firm 2 forward their optical fields containing enough coherent pulses to the final measurement, prior to which a beam splitter op-
) is carried out. Therefore the final state prior to the measurement can be expressed as
Next the measurement on the photon number of the optical fields is carried out, which is usually done by photondetector. We focus on the asymmetric game in which the judge uses different detecting apparatuses to measure the final quantities of two firms. "classical" measuring apparatus is assigned to firm 1, which can only give out the expected values of the photon numbers of the optical fields such as the optical power meter. Quantum measuring apparatus is assigned to firm 2, such as the highly sensitive quantum photon-counter which can measure the photon number and its distribution of the quantum optical fields. For the final state in Eq.(10), the expected value of the photon number of the firm 1 is
The photon number of the optical field of the firm 2 is the non-negative integer m 2 with the Poisson probability distribution P m2 given by
. The average payoffs are given by
denotes the average of u i (n 1 , m 2 ) taken over all possible values of m 2 with the Poisson distribution P m2 . It is still assumed a and c tend to infinity but keeping k = a−c ≥ 1 a finite constant. Thus the quantum payoffs for two firms are obtained as
Here, whenĴ(γ) = I (the identity operator), the scheme can return to the case 3 in the classical asymmetric Cournot's Duopoly, in which quantum fluctuation of the optical field causes the reduce of the payoffs of firm 2. Solving for the Nash equilibrium yields the unique one
under the condition of cos(2γ) ≥ 1 k−1 , and
under the condition of cos(2γ) < 1 k−1 . In Fig.1 , the scaled Nash equilibrium strategies of two firms are plotted as the function of γ and 1/k. The profits of two firms in Nash equilibrium can be easily derived by substituting Eq. (15) or Eq. (16) into Eq. (14) .
when cos(2γ) ≥ 1 k−1 , and
when cos(2γ) < are simultaneously satisfied. Otherwise, U * 1 decreases with γ. U * 2 increases with γ if k > 2 and decreases with γ if 1 ≤ k < 2. When k = 2, the payoff of the firm 2 at the Nash equilibrium is always zero. In Fig.2 , the scaled payoffs of two firms at Nash equilibrium are depicted. The extraordinary aspects of the present asymmetric case are very distinct from the original symmetric game. The payoffs are not only related to the value of γ, but also dependent on the value of k. A second-order transition-like behavior of the payoffs occurs at the points satisfying cos(2γ) = 1 k−1 , which results from the asymmetry of the game. For the firm 1 assigned a classical evaluation, its payoff at the Nash equilibrium is always larger than the one of firm 2. As k increases, the degree of asymmetry decreases which causes the scaled payoffs U 1 /k 2 and U 2 /k 2 to become closer to each other. When cos(2γ) ≥ 1 k−1 , we have
and when cos(2γ)
The region in the plane of cos(2γ) and 1/k for the increase of the total payoff has been clearly indicated in 1+cos(2γ) could be regarded as the degree of cooperation. Then, the expression of the scaled payoff difference can be rewritten as
whens > ξ; Otherwise, when 0 <s < ξ, the scaled payoff difference is given by
For 0 =s < ξ,
At the second-order transition boundary labeled bys = ξ,
The sum and difference of the scaled payoffs of two firms are plotted as the function of γ and 1/k in Fig.4 . Finally, we briefly discuss the physical realization of present scheme. In realistic situation, two players may initially have two single-mode laser diodes which can radiate continuous coherent laser. Two players modulate their laser intensity according to their individual strategic moves and generate enough coherent pulses sequence. Then the coherent pulse sequences pass a beam splitter and are detected by the optical power meter and the highefficient quantum photon-detector, respectively. The optical power meter gives out the average power of the coherent optical pulses. It is easy to transform the average power to the average photon number contained in each pulse. The high-efficient quantum photon-detector should distinguish the Fock states and record their corresponding probability distributions. Up to date, it is still very difficult to experimentally implement multiphoton detection with high enough efficiency. It has been demonstrated a system capable of directly measuring the photon-number state of a single pulse of light using a superconducting transition-edge sensor microcalorimeter. The photon-number distribution of a weak pulsedlaser source at 1550 nm has been verified [23] . A charge integration photon detector that enables the efficient measurement of photon number states at 1530nm wavelengths with a quantum efficiency of 80 percent has been also presented [24] .
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In summary, we presented an asymmetric generalization of classical Cournot's duopoly game, and proposed the simulation scheme of its quantized version, in which the player assigned by a 'classical' measurement scheme always wins the player assigned by a quantum measurement scheme. Due to the common affection of the asymmetric evaluation scheme, the cooperation induced by the beam splitter, and the marginal effect of strategic space, there exists a second-order transition-like behaviors of the payoffs at Nash equilibrium. At the transition boundary, the symmetry and the cooperation become balanced, and the scaled payoff difference is proportional to the degree of asymmetry of the game.
This simulation scheme is symmetric photon-loss free, namely the symmetric photon-loss does not alter the unique property of this quantized asymmetric Cournot's duopoly. If both two firms have the complete information about the photon loss, they can adjust their strategies according to the transformation x i → x i e κ 2 t (κ denotes the photon loss rate), which can guarantee the final payoffs are invariant under the influence of the photon loss process.
The Mandel Q parameter of the optical field heavily affects the characteristics of this kind of the games. In the noncooperation case with ξ = 0, if two players adopt certain kind of optical field fulfilling the inequality (6) as the carrier of their strategic moves, the player assigned by high-efficient quantum photon-detector have the chance to win. While for ξ = 0, the cases become more complicated and will be analyzed in future work.
